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Abstract—A cost-efficient deal that can achieve high sensing quality with a low reward is the permanent goal of the requestor in
mobile crowdsensing, which heavily depends on the quantity and quality of the workers. However, the spatial diversity and temporal
dynamics lead to heterogeneous worker supplies, making it hard for the requestor to utilize a homogeneous pricing strategy to realize a
cost-efficient deal from a systematic point of view. Therefore, a cost-efficient deal calls for a cost-efficient pricing strategy, boosting the
whole sensing quality with less operation (computation) cost. However, the state-of-the-art studies ignore the dual cost-efficient
demands of large-scale sensing tasks. Hence, we propose a combinatorial pinning zero-determinant (ZD) strategy, which empowers the
requestor to utilize a single strategy within its feasible range to minimize the total expected utilities of the workers throughout all
sensing regions for each time interval, without being affected by the strategies of the workers. Through turning the worker-customized
strategy to an interval-customized one, the proposed combinatorial pinning ZD strategy reduces the number of pricing strategies
required by the requestor from O(n3) to O(n). Besides, it extends the application scenarios of the classical ZD strategy from
two-player simultaneous-move games to multiple-heterogeneous-player sequential-move ones, where a leader can determine the
linear relationship of the players’ expected utilities. Such an extension enriches the theoretical hierarchy of ZD strategies, broadening
their application scope. Extensive simulations based on real-world data verify the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Mobile crowdsensing, pricing strategy, quality control, game theory.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MOBILE crowdsensing (MCS), essentially a practiceof sharing economy, leverages the Internet to elicit
scattered sensing services from a large group of participants
for accomplishing a complex task [1]–[4]. As Adam Smith
mentioned in The Wealth of Nations, the market capacity
limits the division. MCS expands the capacity of the
originally scattered market by the Internet, making it large
enough to facilitate a refined task division. As a result,
MCS is capable of breaking through a variety of market
limitations and barriers, exploiting and sharing the off-
the-shelf sensing resources economically and efficiently.
The merits of MCS contribute to its wide study in
various fields, such as environmental quality assessment [5],
transportation monitoring [6], and outdoor positioning [7].
Commercial MCS sites and applications (e.g., Field Agent
[8], Gigwalk [9], Waze [10], and Million Agents [11]) also go
into services.
In a typical MCS, the requestor (crowdsourcer) recruits
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workers (crowdsourcees) to cooperatively perform a
complicated sensing job by rewarding with economic
profits. A cost-efficient deal that can bring high sensing
quality with a low reward is the basic value and permanent
goal of the requestor, which heavily depends on the
quantity and quality of the workers. However, the spatial
diversity and temporal dynamics lead to heterogeneous
worker supplies. For example, as shown in Fig. 1, the heat
maps of the check-in activities during 6:00-7:00 and 12:00-
13:00 in New York City from Foursquare [12] illustrate
the dramatically distinct numbers of visitors in different
areas and time intervals. On one hand, when opportunistic
sensing is adopted, such visitors are potential worker
candidates, which are obviously uneven in both spatial and
temporal dimensions; on the other hand, if participatory
sensing is employed, the workers may have their own
preferences on when and where to provide sensing services.
That is, for both mainstream sensing modes, the differences
in space and time give rise to divergent worker candidate
pools.
The heterogeneous worker supplies make it difficult for
the requestor to utilize a homogeneous pricing strategy for
achieving a cost-efficient deal from a systematic viewpoint.
Meanwhile, it is challenging to lay down fine-grained
pricing strategies with spatial-temporal awareness for the
requestor, especially for large-scale sensing tasks that
involve a wide area with a long time span such as the long-
term urban pollution monitoring. This is because it is a long
haul for the requestor to design optimal pricing strategies
for all workers in different intervals at target sensing regions
in a one-by-one mode. Hence, a cost-efficient deal calls for
a cost-efficient pricing strategy, boosting the whole sensing_______________________________________________
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(a) 6:00-7:00 (b) 12:00-13:00
Fig. 1. Heat maps for check-in venues in New York City on Apr. 4, 2012.
quality with less computational cost.
However, the state-of-the-art studies, e.g., work-
selection-based [13]–[15], task-allocation-based [16]–[18]
and incentive-based methods [19]–[21], ignore the dual cost-
efficient demands, i.e., realizing a cost-efficient deal with a
cost-efficient strategy, of large-scale sensing tasks. In fact, it
is challenging to fulfill such demands since blindly reducing
the payment to a worker is harmful to the utility of the
requestor due to the reduced sensing quality, which is a
natural cascading effect exerted by the worker. To address
this challenge, an intuitive idea is to seek equilibrium
strategies of the requestor and the worker in their game,
under the assumption stating that all players are equal.
Thus, the optimal utility of the requestor is finally achieved
under the bridles of the workers.
In this paper, we tackle the above challenge from a
different angle, by answering the following greedy question:
is it possible for the requestor to minimize the utility of
the worker while maximizing that of herself1 without being
vigilant about the actions a worker may take? The answer
is yes when we resort to the idea of the zero-determinant
(ZD) strategy [22]. The classical ZD strategy provides us
with a revolutionary understanding of Markovian games,
with which the adopter (the ZD player) can unilaterally
set the expected utility of the opponent no matter how the
opponent acts. With the idea of ZD, the requestor is not
affected by the actions of the worker, dominating the game
to pursue a cost-efficient deal.
Nevertheless, it is costly to directly apply the ZD strategy
for meeting the dual cost-efficient demands in that it is
essentially a kind of worker-customized strategy, making
the number of the requestor’s strategies to be na × bi × nt,
where na and nt are respectively the total numbers of target
sensing regions and sensing intervals, and bi denotes the
number of workers in sensing region i ∈ {1, · · · , na}. To
lay down a cost-efficient strategy, we propose a combinatorial
pinning ZD strategy, which empowers the requestor to utilize
a single strategy within its feasible range to minimize the
total expected utilities of the workers throughout all sensing
regions for each interval, without being affected by the
strategies of the workers. Through turning the worker-
customized strategy to an interval-customized one, our
combinatorial pinning ZD strategy reduces the number of
pricing strategies required by the requestor to nt. As a
result, cost-efficient MCS with spatial-temporal awareness
1. For better differentiation, we regard the worker as “he” and the
requestor as “she”.
is achieved, whose effectiveness and efficiency are verified
based on real-world data.
The proposed combinatorial pinning ZD strategy has the
following merits beyond contributing to meeting the dual
cost-efficient demands:
1) it extends the application domain of the classical
ZD strategy from two-player simultaneous-move
games to multiple-heterogeneous-player sequential-
move games;
2) it empowers a leader to solely determine the linear
relationship of the expected utilities of itself and
all the followers in a sequential game, based on
which a special case can be easily derived where the
leader can set a fixed value to the weighted sum of
the heterogeneous followers’ expected utilities, no
matter how the followers react;
3) it enriches the theoretical hierarchy of ZD strategies,
broadening their application scope.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
introduce the most related work in Section 2. The problem
formulation is presented in Section 3. Section 4 displays the
derivation of the combinatorial pinning ZD strategy, based
on which the detailed solution for the cost-efficient MCS is
proposed in Section 5. Experimental evaluation is reported
in Section 6 and the whole paper is concluded in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
Most MCS research focuses on sensing quality and pricing,
the two key elements of MCS. Quality control studies can
be classified into three categories: worker-selection-based,
task-allocation-based, and incentive-mechanism-based. The
first category controls sensing quality by selecting qualified
workers [13]–[15]. For examples, Song et al. [13] proposed
a dynamic selection mechanism to choose the most
appropriate set of participants so as to meet the quality of
information constraint with the consideration of workers’
various properties such as sensing ability, mobility, and so
on; while Zhang et al. [14] employed a concept of coverage
quality to evaluate the quality of the recruited workers,
based on which they presented an approximation algorithm
to select a proper worker subset; and in [15], a framework
was put forward to match qualified workers with sensing
tasks based on the measurement of each worker’s coverage
potential.
In task-allocation-based quality control, the best overall
sensing quality is achieved through optimally assigning
subtasks to selected workers [16]–[18]. In [16], Estrada et
al. presented a time-constrained task allocation framework
where a quality-aware task allocation algorithm was
implemented based on Particle Swarm Optimization. In [17],
the sensing quality of each task was taken into consideration
and task-specific minimal sensing quality thresholds were
introduced to redefine the multi-task allocation problem,
based on which a novel framework named MTakser was
proposed using a descent greedy approach. Wang et al. [18]
focused on the overall sensed data error throughout the
sensing areas instead of the traditional sensing coverage
ratio based quality metric, and proposed a task allocation
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framework to dynamically select sensing subareas for
reducing the number of task assignments.
Incentive-mechanism-based schemes integrate quality
control into incentive mechanisms for MCS [19]–[21]. In
[19], a quality-driven incentive mechanism based on the
reverse Vickrey auction was proposed to maximize the
social welfare, where each worker was paid according to
the submitted quality. Similarly, Jin et al. [20] designed
two incentive mechanisms incorporating the metric of
workers’ quality of information, which relied on reverse
combinatorial auctions, including both the single-minded
and multi-minded models. Besides, Peng et al. [21] adopted
the expectation maximization algorithm and Bayesian
inference to predict the data quality, and further employed
an information theory based model to measure the
effectiveness of the contributed data.
Pricing is another means to realize quality control in
MCS [23], [24]. In [23], Han et al. studied the pricing
problem with the consideration of sensing quality in MCS
and solved this NP-hard problem using the properties of
Poisson binomial distributions. Tian et al. [24] proposed
an online learning technique based pricing scheme after
revealing the data quality assessment principle in the
MCS-based wireless fingerprint scenarios. Note that none
of the works mentioned above considered the dual cost-
efficient demands in MCS or the challenges resulted from
the spatiotemporal heterogeneity of the worker supplies to
design a cost-efficient pricing strategy for the requestor so
as to realize a cost-efficient deal, which stimulates our work
in this paper.
To be specific, we utilize the multi-player sequential
game to model the interactions between the requestor and
the workers in an MCS and develop the combinatorial
pinning ZD strategy for this game, which is exactly an
extension of the original ZD strategy. Generally speaking,
existing extensions of the ZD strategy are mainly carried out
from two perspectives: the number of players and the order
of actions. For the former, Pan et al. [25] first explored the
extension of the ZD strategy for the iterated public goods
game involving multiple players with simultaneous moves,
and Hilbe et al. [26] further proposed the concept of ZD
alliance, and then continued to analyze the evolutionary
performance of the ZD strategy in the multi-player game
[27]; while for the latter, Hu et al. [28] exerted their
efforts in studying the sequential ZD strategy for the two-
player sequential game and applying it to enhance the
crowdsourcing quality.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
A large-scale mobile crowdsensing scenario is considered
in this paper, where a long-term sensing task needs to
be completed by workers located at different regions.
The requestor is allowed to offer each worker a normal
payment or an underpayment and she can employ the
same worker for many times. Hence, after a worker
witnesses the payment of the requestor, the inherent profit-
driven property and the willingness of providing long-term
services drive him to decide whether or not to submit high-
quality sensing data. The higher the submission quality, the
higher the sensing cost and the higher the job opportunity
in the future, and vice versa. The working process in one
round of MCS is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Working process in one round of MCS.
The features of the repeated interactions, sequential
decision-making, and multi-participation are highly
compatible with the characteristics of the iterated multi-
player sequential game. Therefore, we take advantage of
this game to model the interplay between the requestor
and the workers. Specifically, each player in this game
has two actions: cooperation, denoted as c, and defection,
indicated by d. The cooperation action of the requestor is
to offer the normal payment while her defection action is
underpayment; for any worker in a certain sensing region,
with the awareness of the requestor’s action, he can choose
the action c by providing high-quality sensing data, or d by
submitting low-quality ones.
In fact, the action of a player is driven by utility. We
divide the whole sensing time into multiple intervals for
the consideration of time-sensitive subtasks, and the action
of each player is regarded unchanged during each interval.














where na is the total number of target sensing regions,
bi denotes the number of workers in sensing region i ∈
{1, · · · , na}, wtij refers to the action of worker j in region i
at interval t, and rtij represents the action of the requestor
against wtij . In the above equation, the first term denotes
the profit of the requestor obtained from the sensing data
in all target regions2, while the second one represents her
cost, i.e., the payment to the workers. Particularly, Ar and
Br > 0 are scale parameters, x(·) represents the profit of
the requestor from each worker, and y(·) is the cost function
related to the action of the requestor, i.e., the payment to
each worker. Note that functions x(·) and y(·) here are in
general forms and they will be assigned specific formulas in
the experiment section. Also note that in the profit and cost
2. Here we consider that the requestor hires the exact number of
workers to complete the MCS task without any redundancy, and thus
her profit is proportional to the number of workers. In addition,
even for the case of workers’ submissions leading to the marginal
utility diminishing problem for the requestor, the basic methodology
to achieve the cost-efficient mobile crowdsensing remains unchanged.
Thus we consider the summation form of the requestor’s utility
benefiting from all workers for the brevity of analysis in this paper.
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functions, the action c results in a higher value while d leads
to a lower one.
Similarly, the utility of any worker j in region i at
interval t can be defined as
stij = A
ijy(rtij)−Bijctij(wtij), (2)
where Aij , Bij > 0 are scale parameters, and ctij(·) is the
cost function of worker j in region i at interval t, which is
higher with behavior c and lower with d. The specific form
of ctij(·) will be exemplified in our experimental studies.
Note that all str and s
t
ij (i ∈ {1, · · · , na}, j ∈ {1, · · · , bi})
are non-negative, since otherwise no one would take part in
the MCS.
In light of (1), the requestor should lay down a pricing
strategy for every worker in each region at any interval.
Let nt be the total number of sensing intervals. Then, the
requestor needs to work out na × bi × nt pricing strategies,
which is a long haul for the requestor. Hence, there is
a pressing need to study the pricing strategies for the
requestor in a cost-efficient way. According to the utility
functions shown in (1) and (2), we can derive the expected
utilities of the requestor and any worker j in region i at














ij ỹ(htij)−Bij c̃tij(f tij),
where f tij and h
t
ij ∈ [0, 1] are respectively the probability
for worker j to choose c in region i at interval t
and that of the requestor when playing against this
worker; x̃(·), ỹ(·), c̃tij(·) are monotonically increasing
with the cooperation probability whose maximum and
minimum are respectively equal to x(c), y(c), ctij(c) and












< 0 since Ar, Br > 0 and x̃(·), ỹ(·)
are both monotone increasing functions, which indicate that
the expected utility of the requestor is increasing with the
cooperation probability of each worker f tij and decreasing
with her own cooperation probability htij . Through a similar
analysis, we can find that the expected utility of worker j in
region i at interval t is in the opposite situation where a
higher htij and a lower f
t
ij lead to a larger value.
Fig. 3 plots an example of the expected utility of the
requestor brought by a worker and that of the worker, where













Ar = 6, Br = 2, Aij = Bij = 1, na = 4, bi = 1, j = 1, i ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4}. According to this figure, we can find that at the
point (f tij , h
t
ij) = (1, 0), the expected utility of the requestor
is maximized while that of the worker is minimized.
Based on the above analysis, one can see that the
requestor has to minimize the utility of the worker in
order to maximize her own utility. However, it is not
only time-consuming but also energy-consuming for the
requestor to work out each pricing strategy to minimize
every worker’s expected utility in a one-by-one manner,
which calls for cost-efficient operations. To that aim, we turn


















Fig. 3. Expected utilities of the requestor and the worker.
an interval-customized one. More specifically, the requestor
can formulate a pricing strategy for each interval rather
than each worker to minimize the expected utilities of the
workers in all sensing regions. As a result, the number of
pricing strategies the requestor should work out reduces
from na × bi × nt to nt.
Let rj be the sum of the workers’ expected utilities in all
sensing regions at interval j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nt}. Then, the goal
of our interval-customized pricing strategy is to minimize
{r1, r2, . . . , rnt}, where
r1 = a11π1 + a12π2 + · · ·+ a1naπna ,
r2 = a21π1 + a22π2 + · · ·+ a2naπna ,
...
...
rnt = ant1π1 + ant2π2 + · · ·+ antnaπna .
(3)
In the above equation, aji, i ∈ {1, · · · , na}, j ∈ {1, · · · , nt},
is the number of workers in region i at interval j, and πi is
the expected utility of any worker in region i .
To realize a cost-efficient deal, an intuitive idea is to
search for the equilibrium strategies for all players in their
game, and then the optimal utility of the requestor is
constrained by the actions of the workers. Differently, in this
paper, we intend to realize a greedy goal that enables the
requestor to minimize the utilities of the workers without
any concern about the workers’ actions. An intuitive idea
to minimize any rj (j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nt}) is to enable the
requestor to set its value to be the minimum. Such an idea
is totally out of imagination since the expected utility of
each player is not only decided by his/er own action but
also dependent on those of the opponents in classic game
theories. This drives us to resort to the ZD strategy [22],
which was proposed by Press and Dyson and provided us
with a revolutionary understanding of Markovian games.
Taking advantage of ZD, a ZD player can unilaterally set
the expected utility of its opponent or the ratio of their
expected utilities, no matter what actions the opponent
adopts. Hence, ZD strategies offer us the opportunities to
achieve our goal.
However, it is costly to directly apply ZD strategies to
our problem in that they are essentially worker-customized.
To realize an interval-customized pricing strategy, the
requestor needs to employ a homogeneous strategy to
set the expected utilities of the workers throughout all
sensing regions for a specific interval, so as to reduce
the computational cost with the consideration of the
spatiotemporal heterogeneity about the number of workers.
This requires to extend ZD, which was originally designed
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for iterated two-player simultaneous games, so as to make
it suitable for iterated multiple-player sequential games.
More importantly, such an extension should empower the
requestor to set a given value to the linear combination of
the expected utilities of the workers in different regions.
In other words, the requestor can make rj =
∑na
i=1 ajiπi
(j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nt}) hold no matter how the workers act.
Due to its function, we call this extended ZD strategy the
combinatorial pinning ZD strategy. In next section, we shall
detail the method on how to realize this ZD strategy, which
can not only be utilized to solve our problem, but also enrich
the theoretical hierarchy of ZD strategies, broadening their
application scope.
4 COMBINATORIAL PINNING ZD STRATEGY
The proposed combinatorial pinning ZD strategy is
applicable to an iterated multiple-player sequential game,
which contains two types of players, namely first-move
players (leaders) and second-move players (followers). Here
we focus on a scenario with one leader, denoted as n0, and
N followers, indicated by {n1, n2, · · · , nN}. Each player
has two possible actions, i.e., cooperation (c) and defection
(d). Thus, there could be in total η = 2(N+1) game states,
denoted by
e0e1 · · · eN = {c
N︷ ︸︸ ︷




cc · · · d︸ ︷︷ ︸
g2
, · · · , d
N︷ ︸︸ ︷
dd · · · d︸ ︷︷ ︸
gη
}, (4)
where e0 and ei respectively represent the actions of leader
n0 and follower ni. For brevity, we denote the set of game
states as G = {g1, g2, · · · , gη}.
It is reasonable for the leader to choose its action
according to the game result of the previous round. This
assumption is consistent with the conclusion in [22], which
states that a short-memory player has no disadvantage
compared to a long-memory one. Thus, following the order
of game states listed in (4), we define the strategy of the
leader as p = (p1, p2, · · · , pη), where each element pi is
the conditional probability of choosing action c when the
game state of the previous round is gi; accordingly, 1− pi is
the conditional probability of choosing d given the previous
game state of gi.
For any follower ni, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, since it moves
after n0, it is rational to react based on the action of the
leader in the same round. As the action e0 of the leader
could be either c or d, we define the strategy of follower






2) refers to the conditional
probability of choosing c when the leader performs c (d) in
the current round. Thus, 1 − qi1 and 1 − qi2 are respectively
the defection probabilities when the leader cooperates or
defects in the current round.
Given the above definitions of p and qi, i ∈ {1, · · · , N},
one can formulate the state transition matrix of the game as
M = [Muv]η×η, (5)
where each element Muv denotes the transition probability






with P andQi being the action probabilities of leader n0 and
follower ni at state gv . In particular, we denote the action of
n0 in state gv as z0, which equals 1 when e0 = c and 0 when
e0 = d. Similarly, the action of ni at state gv is denoted as
zi, with value 1 when ei = c and 0 otherwise. Thus, we can
calculate P and Qi as follows:
P = (pu)
z0(1− pu)1−z0 , (6)
Qi = {(qi1)z0(qi2)1−z0}zi{1− (qi1)z0(qi2)1−z0}1−zi . (7)
Note that the calculation of P in (6) depends on pu, i.e.,
the cooperation probability of n0 when the last game state
is gu, which is resulted from the assumption that the leader
makes decisions based on the game state of the previous
round. Clearly, when the current game state gv indicates that
the action of n0 is c, P = pu; otherwise, P = 1 − pu. While
the computation of Qi in (7) seems to be more complicated,
which is resulted from the follower’s property of relying
on the action of the leader in the current round. When the
current action of the leader is c, qi1 functions actively, which
can be combined with the action requirement of the current
state gv to finally determine the value of Qi, i.e., qi1 or 1−qi1;
otherwise, it is qi2 that functions.
Next, we define a matrix M′ = M − I with I denoting
the identity matrix with the same size as M, i.e., η × η. If
the stable vector of the state transition matrix M is denoted
as v, we have vTM = vT, which is also equivalent to
vTM′ = 0. When we apply the Cramer’s rule to matrix
M′, we have Adj(M′)M′ = det(M′)I = 0 with Adj(M′)
denoting the adjugate matrix. Combining the above two
equations, we can conclude that v is proportional to each
row of Adj(M′). Let M′ = [M1,M2, · · · ,Mη], where
Mi = [M1i,M2i, · · · ,Mηi]T is a vector consisting of the ith
column of M′. Thus, for any vector f = [f1, f2, · · · , fη]T, we
can compute its dot product with the stable vector v as
v · f = det[M1,M2, · · · ,Mη−1, f ]. (8)
As we all know, elementary transformations of a matrix
cannot change its determinant value. Thus, we can first find
a column in M′ corresponding to a particular current game
state which is consisted of the leader’s cooperation and all
followers’ defection, i.e., e0e1 · · · eN = cd · · · d. It is easy to
see that this column is the η2 th element of M
′, following





i=1(1 − qi1), p2
∏N




T. Next, we conduct an elementary column operation on
matrix M′ by adding all columns before the η2 one, i.e., from
the first column to the (η2 − 1)th one, to the
η
2 th column. By
doing this, one can easily calculate the updated value of the
η
2 th column as follows, denoted by M̂ η2 ,
M̂ η
2
= [p1 − 1, p2 − 1, · · · , p η
2
− 1, p η
2 +1
, · · · , pη]T. (9)
Therefore, the dot product between v and f turns to be
v · f =det[M1, · · · , M̂ η
2
































Clearly, the η2 th column of the matrix, i.e., M̂ η2 , is fully
decided by the strategy of the leader. In this case, for any
constant parameter φ 6= 0, when the leader sets its strategy
p to make M̂ η
2
= φf , the η2 th column is proportional to the
last column, leading to the zero determinant value in (10),
i.e., v · f = 0.
Leveraging on the stable vector of the state transition
matrix in the Markov process, we can calculate the expected






det[M1, · · · ,Mη−1,Si]
det[M1, · · · ,Mη−1,1]
,
where Si = {S1i , S2i , · · · , S
η
i } is the payoff vector of player
ni with each element S
j
i corresponding to the payoff of
game state gj , j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , η}, and 1 refers to a vector
consisting of η components of 1. In this situation, when we





αiEi − γ =
v · (α0S0 +
∑N
i=1 αiSi − γ1)
v · 1
=
det[M1, · · · ,Mη−1, α0S0 +
∑N
i=1 αiSi − γ1]
det[M1, · · · ,Mη−1,1]
,
where αi (i ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , N}) is a constant. According to





i=1 αiSi − γ1) (φ 6= 0), the numerator




αiEi − γ = 0. (11)
Therefore, with an appropriate setting of its strategy,
the leader can control the linear relationship between its
expected payoff and those of the followers. Particularly,
when α0 = 0, the above equation becomes
N∑
i=1
αiEi = γ, (12)
and in this case, the corresponding strategy p of the leader






αiSi − γ1) (φ 6= 0). (13)
By adopting the strategy satisfying condition (13), the
leader can unilaterally set the weighted sum of the expected
payoffs of all followers to be a fixed value, no matter what
actions these followers adopt. Hence, we call this strategy
a combinatorial pinning ZD strategy, which is applicable
to iterated multiple-player sequential games. Compared
with the original ZD strategies derived for iterated two-
player simultaneous games, the combinatorial pinning ZD
strategy has its characteristic of only allowing the leader to
unilaterally set the expected payoffs of others (followers).
In other words, the players are equal in the original ZD
strategies while the leader dominates in the combinatorial
pinning ZD strategy. One can see that the combinatorial
pinning ZD strategy can not only enrich the theoretical
hierarchy of ZD strategies but also be used to solve the
problem we formulate in Section 3, which will be detailed
in the next section.
5 COST-EFFICIENT MCS
In this section, we employ the combinatorial pinning ZD
strategy to realize a cost-efficient MCS with spatial-temporal
awareness. Our main idea is to design a set of interval-
customized pricing strategies for the requestor, namely
ρ = {p̃1, p̃2, · · · , p̃nt}, with each element p̃j being able
to minimize the total expected utilities of all workers at
a certain interval j (j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nt}). Next, we explain
how to obtain each p̃j . Let the strategy of the worker in
region i at interval j be q̃ij = (q̃ij1 , q̃
ij




2 ) is the
worker’s conditional probability of performing c given the
requestor’s action c (d) in the current round. Thus, we can








































where ζ is the number of game states between the requestor
and the workers. Next, with similar calculations presented
in the previous section, we can find that the ζ2 th column
in the adjugate matrix of H, denoted as Ĥ ζ
2
= [p̃j1 −






, · · · , p̃jζ ]T, can be unilaterally
determined by the requestor’s strategy. Based on this, the
requestor can set rj =
∑na
i=1 ajiπi to any value as long
as her strategy is meaningful, i.e., p̃jk ∈ [0, 1], where
k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ζ}.
Hence, the problem of employing the combinatorial
pinning ZD strategy to realize a cost-efficient deal in MCS
with cost-efficient strategies can be addressed by solving
the following constrained optimization problem for each















where Fji = [F 1ji, F
2
ji, · · · , F
ζ
ji] is the utility vector of
any worker in region i at interval j with each F kji (k ∈
{1, 2, · · · , ζ}) being calculated in light of (2)3. According
to the last constraint, we can solve the above optimization
problem by considering the following two cases.
3. We don’t consider the index of the workers in the same region
when computing the expected utility of any worker.
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Case 1: φ > 0. To meet the constraint p̃j ≥ 0, we can get
an upper bound of rj as follows:





















+ 1, · · · , ζ.
While to satisfy p̃j ≤ 1, we can obtain a lower bound of rj ,





















+ 1, · · · , ζ.
Since only if rminj ≤ rmaxj can rj have a feasible
solution, which is equal to max(βl) ≤ min(βk), ∀k ∈
{1, 2, · · · , ζ}, ∀l ∈ {ζ + 1, ζ + 2, · · · , 2ζ}. If there exists































Case 2: φ < 0. Considering the constraint p̃j ≥ 0, we
have
rminj = max(βk), ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ζ}.
And according to p̃j ≤ 1, we have
rmaxj = min(βl), ∀l ∈ {ζ + 1, ζ + 2, · · · , 2ζ}.
Similarly, rj has a feasible solution only when rminj ≤ rmaxj
holds, i.e., max(βk) ≤ min(βl), ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ζ}, ∀l ∈
{ζ + 1, ζ + 2, · · · , 2ζ}. If we can find φ < 0 that makes this






























In summary, the requestor can unilaterally set the total
expected utilities of the workers in all regions at any interval
j to be the lowest one, i.e., rminj , when she adopts the
combinatorial pinning ZD strategy p̃j = (p̃j1, p̃
j
























ji − rminj ), k =
ζ
2
+ 1, · · · , ζ.
(15)
By this means, the requestor can derive the set
of interval-customized pricing strategies, namely ρ =
{p̃1, p̃2, · · · , p̃nt}, to minimize the total expected utilities
{r1, r2, · · · , rnt}. Hence, the corresponding expected utility
of any worker in each region at every interval can be
calculated by solving (3), which indicates the potential of
our proposed combinatorial pinning ZD strategy to transfer
the setting of individual-customized expected utility to
a category-customized one. Let A = [aji]nt×na , Π =
[π1, π2, · · · , πna ]T and r = [r1, r2, · · · , rnt ]T; thus the
equation group in (3) can be denoted as A ·Π = r. As the
number of workers in each sensing region and time interval
varies, we consider the following three cases.
Case 1: If nt = na, the coefficient matrix A is a square.
We have the following subcases with respect to different
determinant values of A:
• When det(A) 6= 0, according to the Cramer’s rule,
we can get the result of Π as πi =
det(Ai)
det(A) , i =
1, · · · , na, where Ai is the matrix formed by
substituting the ith column of A with the vector r.
• When det(A) = 0 and rank(A) = rank(A, r),
there exist multiple solutions for Π, from which the
requestor can select one.
• When det(A) = 0 and rank(A) < rank(A, r),
there exists no solution for Π, which means that
the requestor cannot efficiently set the expected
utilities of the workers. In this case, the requestor
can redivide the sensing regions and intervals to find
suitable nt and na such that the optimal strategies of
the requestor and the expected utility of any worker
can be derived.
Case 2: If na > nt, there exist multiple solutions for (3); and
the requestor can select any one to reach her goal.
Case 3: If na < nt, no solution exists unless rank(A, r) = na,
which can be addressed with the discussions in Case 1.
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
cost-efficient MCS based on a real-world dataset. The
dataset contains the long-term check-in data in the New
York City collected by Foursquare from Apr. 3, 2012 to
Feb. 16, 2013 [12], which includes 227,428 records generated
from 1,083 users at more than 40,000 locations. In our
experiment, we utilize this check-in dataset to simulate
a mobile crowdsensing scenario where the visitors are
workers to undertake a large-scale sensing task assigned
by the requestor, and implement it using Matlab R2018a
on a machine with 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 processor. To that
aim, we divide the New York City into four target sensing
regions, i.e., na = 4, and nt is also set to be 4. Besides, for
the utility function of the requestor, we set Ar = 0.5 and
Br = 0.1, the profit function x(c) = 1 and x(d) = 0.5,
and the cost function y(c) = 2 and y(d) = 1; while for
those of the worker j in region i (i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}), we
set Aij = Bij = 1, and the cost function cij(c) = 1
and cij(d) = 0.5. Each experiment is repeated 30 times to
get the average result for statistical confidence. It is worth
noting that we also test other parameter settings, which
present very similar results; thus we omit them to avoid
redundancy.
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In order to verify the effectiveness of our proposed
combinatorial pinning ZD (CPZD) strategy based scheme,
we compare it with three other classical strategies. To
be specific, we simulate the game process between
the requestor and the workers in 100 rounds, where
the requestor adopts CPZD, all-cooperation (ALLC), all-
defection (ALLD), and random (Random) strategies, while
the workers take ALLC, ALLD, Random, tit-for-tat (TFT),
and mixed (Mixed) strategies. A player adopting ALLC
strategy always cooperates no matter what the opponent
behaves; on the contrary, an ALLD player always defects.
With Random strategy, a player cooperates with the
probability of 0.5; a TFT player follows the choice of the
opponent in the previous round. We also consider the
situation of Mixed strategy where the workers in each
region adopt a specific strategy chosen from ALLC, ALLD,
Random, and TFT.
We first evaluate our proposed strategy for the total
expected utility optimization at a specific interval. To that
aim, we utilize the check-in data during 18:00 to 19:00 on
Apr. 3, 2012 where the distribution of the visitors (workers)
in different regions is [a11, a12, a13, a14] = [11, 43, 13, 18].
And we set φ = −0.001 to meet the requirement of
rmin1 ≤ rmax1 as mentioned in Section 5. Fig. 4 plots the
total expected utilities of the workers in each round when
the requestor adopts the CPZD strategy and the workers
employ different strategies. To clearly display the evolution
process, we only present the results in the first 20 rounds.
It is clear that no matter what kind of strategy the workers
adopt, their total expected utilities finally converge to a fixed
value, verifying the power of the proposed combinatorial
pinning ZD strategy. Figs. 5 (a)(b)(c)(d) present the final total
expected utilities of the workers when the requestor takes
CPZD, ALLC, ALLD, and Random strategies, respectively.
By comparing Fig. 5(a) with the other three figures, one can
easily find that the total expected utilities of the workers
change with the worker’s own strategy in the cases of the
requestor adopting ALLC, ALLD and Random strategies,
and that they are mostly larger than the corresponding
values when the requestor adopts the CPZD strategy except
for the ALLD case. However, the requestor is unwise to
adopt an ALLD strategy in real life since she would suffer
from a bad reputation and is hard to recruit workers in
the future. Besides, on average, the running time of our
proposed CPZD strategy playing against ALLC, ALLD,
Random, TFT and Mixed strategies in a specific interval are
respectively 1.8 ms, 1.0 ms, 2.9 ms, 2.4 ms and 4.0 ms.
Next, we investigate the effectiveness of our proposed
strategy for multi-interval optimization. Similarly, we make
use of the check-in data from 18:00 to 22:00 in Apr. 3,
2012, where the time interval is set to be one hour, and the
distributions of the workers in the four regions are given by
[aji]4×4. To be specific, [a11, a12, a13, a14] = [11, 43, 13, 18],
[a21, a22, a23, a24] = [26, 35, 12, 14], [a31, a32, a33, a34] =
[20, 47, 16, 16], and [a41, a42, a43, a44] = [42, 60, 18, 17]. With
the same parameter and strategy settings mentioned above,
we plot the simulation results in Figs. 6 and 7. Fig. 6 presents
the time-varying total expected utilities of the workers with
ALLC, ALLD, Random, TFT, and Mixed strategies, against
the requestor adopting the proposed CPZD strategy. For
clarity, we also focus on the first 20 rounds of the game. It is




































Fig. 4. Evolution of the total expected utilities of the workers in one
interval.


































































































































Fig. 5. Total expected utilities of the workers in a specific interval.
obvious the total utilities of the workers always converge to
certain values whatever strategy the workers adopt. And
Fig. 7 displays the total utilities of the workers in each
interval. By comparing the results in Fig. 7(a) and those of
the other three figures, we can conclude that our proposed
CPZD strategy based method can help the requestor to
always set the total expected utilities of the workers to be
a stably minimum level except for the situation with an
irrational requestor adopting the ALLD strategy. And the
average running time of CPZD strategy of the requestor
playing against ALLC, ALLD, Random, TFT, and Mixed
strategies of the workers in four intervals are 5.7 ms, 4.3
ms, 10.0 ms, 8.7 ms, and 14.5 ms, respectively.
It is worth noting that the above performance
comparisons involve no incentive-based schemes because
it is inappropriate to do that for the following reasons.
First, the main goal of incentive mechanisms is different
from ours, where the incentive-based ones mainly aim at
incentivizing wide participation of workers or eliciting high-
quality submissions from workers, while we intend to figure
out how to achieve a cost-efficient deal with a cost-efficient
strategy for the requestor. Second, the modeling system of
9


































Fig. 6. Evolution of the total expected utilities of the workers in all
intervals.
the incentive-based mechanisms is distinct from our model.
To be specific, several auction-based incentive mechanisms
define the actions of workers as the bidding price for
completing the sensing task, and others regard the effort
levels of the workers as their individual actions in a discrete
manner; while in our model, we consider any worker may
exert cooperation action by providing high-quality sensing
result with a continuous probability, which is more general.
Finally, we study how the number of workers affects the
minimum expected utilities of all workers in each interval
and the strategy of the requestor according to our proposed
scheme. The same check-in data and parameter settings
mentioned above are adopted, and hence det(A) 6= 0, which
means that we can get a unique solution of Π. In Figs. 8 and
9, we respectively adjust the values of each row and column
of A, making them twice, three times, and four times of the
original ones. As shown in Fig. 8, the minimum expected
utilities of all workers in different regions at interval j, i.e.,
rj , increase with the values of the jth row in the coefficient
matrix A, i.e., the number of workers in different regions
at interval j, while other ri (i 6= j) has no change. It is
consistent with the fact that more workers in an interval
make the requestor set higher expected utilities in total.
While in Fig. 9, it is easy to find that the values of all rj
increase with the value of any column, i.e., the number of
workers in a specific region at different intervals, which is
also reasonable since more workers can bring more expected
utilities.
Similarly, we plot the strategy of the requestor in each
interval changing with the values of each row and column
of A in Figs. 10 and 11, respectively. It is worth mentioning
that the requestor’s strategy in interval j, i.e., p̃j , has 32
components because there are one leader (the requestor) and
four followers (workers in four different sensing regions),
resulting in ζ = 25 = 32. In general, the requestor
tends to be more cooperative when she cooperates in the
last round but less cooperative when she defects in the
previous game state. And in Fig. 10, it is easy to find that
p̃j decreases as the values of the jth row in A increase,
which is because the increasing number of workers in a
specific interval reduces the requestor’s demand of high-
quality sensing from one individual worker, resulting in her
provision of less payment. With the same underlying reason,
the cooperation probability of the requestor also slightly
decreases with the increase of the column values as shown
in Fig. 11.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
As a practice of sharing economy, MCS can exploit the
off-the-shelf sensing resources economically and efficiently.
The state-of-the-art studies ignore the dual cost-efficient
demands, i.e., realizing a cost-efficient deal with a cost-
efficient strategy, in large-scale sensing tasks. Hence, we
propose a combinatorial pinning ZD strategy to empower
the requestor to employ a single strategy within its
feasible range for minimizing the total expected utilities
of the workers throughout all sensing regions for each
interval, without concerning about the actions a worker
may take. Through turning the worker-customized strategy
to an interval-customized one, the proposed combinatorial
pinning ZD strategy reduces the number of the requestor’s
pricing strategies from O(n3) to O(n). We evaluate the
performance of the proposed cost-efficient MCS based on
the check-in data from Foursquare. The simulation results
verify that our scheme can always pin the expected utilities
of the workers at a stably minimum level except for the
situation with an irrational requestor adopting the ALLD
strategy. Moreover, when the number of workers increases,
the requestor can decrease her cooperation probability since
the demand of high-quality sensing data from an individual
worker decreases.
In our future research, we will consider the impact of
mobility prediction on task assignments in MCS, which may
result in more efficient MCS by computing mobile paths in
advance; we also will investigate the challenges brought by
the heterogeneity of the workers’ various sensing abilities in
MCS.
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